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Perspectives and Reform
Suggestions
BY ROBIN HUI HUANG ∗, QIANG HAN †, & XIUWEN ZHU ‡
ABSTRACT

China has become one of the largest mobile payment markets in the
world. While mobile payments bring great benefits such as convenience,
flexibility, and efficiency, they are not without risks. This article focuses on
one of the major risks, namely the data privacy risk, which is in large part
caused and exacerbated by the involvement of multiple players and the
extensive collection of personal information. There were some difficulties in
protecting data privacy under the traditional legal framework, which was
developed in a piecemeal manner with relevant provisions scattered around
many different laws. In response, China has been trying to consolidate and
modernise its regulatory regime for data privacy to suit the needs of the new
digital era. Over the past few years, China has made great efforts to enact
new laws and regulations to delineate the scope of personal information,
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introduce the obligations for data controllers and processors, and incorporate
the principles of the Fair Information Practices. However, there are some
remaining concerns, including the ineffective requirements of consent and
disclosure, the ambiguous principle of purpose limitation, and the limited
applicability of the principle of data minimisation. In a quest for a more
effective solution to meet the regulatory challenge and strike a proper
balance between privacy protection and technological innovation, a
comparative analysis is conducted with several other major jurisdictions in
this area, including the United States, the European Union, Singapore and
Hong Kong. This article proposes that China should 1) improve the
requirements of consent and disclosure; 2) strengthen the application of the
principles of purpose limitation and data minimization; 3) enact a
specific law for data protection; 4) establish a unified law enforcement
agency, and 5) enhance private and public enforcement.
Keywords: data privacy, data protection, mobile payment, China,
comparative study
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1. INTRODUCTION
While there is no universal definition of mobile payments, they can be
generally understood as payments “for which the payment data and the
payment instruction are initiated, transmitted or confirmed via a mobile
phone or device.” 1 As a key component of Fintech, mobile payments offer a
much more convenient means of payment than the traditional means, and can
be classified into different types depending on the technologies used. 2
China’s mobile payment industry has experienced explosive growth since
2013 and has played a significant role in the Chinese economy while
increasing its influence in many overseas markets.
Mobile payments bring various benefits to consumers, such as
flexibility, convenience, and a well-integrated purchase experience. It is also
beneficial to merchants in terms of its lower cost of record-keeping and
accounting, higher operational efficiency, and stronger digitising marketing
capacity. 3 Nevertheless, mobile payments are not without risks. 4 First,
mobile payments are plagued by data privacy and security risks. Data privacy
issues concern primarily unauthorized processing of data for commercial
purposes, such as targeted advertisements. The data may also leak out mainly
through an illegal data transaction or as a cybersecurity issue. Mobile devices
are susceptible to viruses, worms and other malicious applications that could
illegally track, steal and misuse users’ sensitive financial information and
pose a grave threat to the safety of their funds. Secondly, mobile payment
users could be exposed to the risk of deceptive commercial practices linked
with inadequate or misleading disclosure. For example, consumers can be
overcharged when the essential information about the actual cost of a

1. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GREEN PAPER: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED EUROPEAN MARKET FOR
CARD, INTERNET AND MOBILE PAYMENTS 5 ((2012), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0941&from=EN (last visited June 13, 2021).
2. For a more detailed discussion of the typology of mobile payments in China, see Robin Hui
Huang, et al., The Development and Regulation of Mobile Payment: Chinese Experiences and
Comparative Perspectives, 20(1) WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming n.d.).
3. ASIA PACIFIC FOUNDATION OF CANADA (hereinafter “APFOC”), THE MOBILE PAYMENT
REVOLUTION IN CHINA 4 (2019), https://www.asiapacific.ca/sites/default/files/publicationpdf/mobile_payment_report.pdf
4. For a comprehensive discussion of the risks of mobile payment in China, see HUANG ET AL.,
supra n. 2; OECD, REPORT ON CONSUMER PROTECTION IN ONLINE AND MOBILE PAYMENTS 22 (2012),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5k9490gwp7f3en.pdf?expires=1623728336&id=id&accname=
guest&checksum=9BE6F1AC10DFEDAAA40E2CDD1E194E9D (last accessed June 14, 2021). ;
ANDREW JAMES LAKE, RISK MANAGEMENT IN MOBILE MONEY: OBSERVED RISKS AND PROPOSED
MITIGANTS FOR MOBILE MONEY OPERATORS (2013), https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/e6ae6dd9ad8c-4663-9c38832c1d46a9f0/Tool+7.1.+Risk+Management.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=khAOg2B;
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transaction is hidden in the terms and conditions of the transaction. 5 Thirdly,
the liquidity risk of mobile payment may occur when a third-party payment
service provider does not have sufficient liquid assets to meet its debts. Due
to reasons such as space constraints, this paper will focus on the important
issue of protecting data privacy. 6 Cybersecurity presents a big issue that
would warrant the separate treatment of another full paper, but will be
mentioned in this paper where necessary due to its close connection with the
issue of data privacy.
The objective of this paper is to critically evaluate the efficiency of data
privacy protection in the context of mobile payments in China and, based on
this evaluation, to suggest improvements. Part 2 delineates the development
of mobile payment in China and the privacy risks specific to the mobile
payment business. Part 3 discusses China’s regulatory framework for
protecting data privacy, including its historical evolution and key elements
of the current regime. Part 4 conducts a comparative study of relevant
experiences from other jurisdictions, including the United States, the
European Union, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Part 5 evaluates the Chinese
regulatory regime from a comparative perspective, identifying its strengths
and weaknesses, and makes relevant proposals for improvement. The last
part concludes that despite the great improvement in the area of data privacy
protection, China should 1) improve the requirements of consent and
disclosure; 2) strengthen the application of the principles of purpose
limitation and data minimization; 3) enact a specific law for data protection;
4) establish a unified law enforcement agency, and 5) enhance private
and public enforcement..
2. MOBILE PAYMENT DEVELOPMENTS AND DATA PROTECTION ISSUES IN
CHINA
2.1 Overview
The development of the mobile payment market in China has not been
a smooth curve. Before 2010, telecommunication operators, commercial
5. OECD, REPORT ON CONSUMER PROTECTION IN ONLINE AND MOBILE PAYMENTS, 22 (2012),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5k9490gwp7f3en.pdf?expires=1623728336&id=id&accname=
guest&checksum=9BE6F1AC10DFEDAAA40E2CDD1E194E9D (last accessed June 26, 2021)
6. On Nov. 2, 2020, Mr Gang Yi (易刚)，the President of the Chinese central bank, People’s
Bank of China, attended a conference during the Hong Kong Fintech Week, stating that Fintech is a rulechanger in the financial markets and consumer privacy protection presents a huge challenge. SINA, Yi
Gang: Big technology companies are game changers in finance, consumer privacy protection is a great
challenge,
21ST
CENTURY
BUSINESS
HERALD
(Nov.
2,
2020,
2:37pm),
https://finance.sina.com.cn/china/gncj/2020-11-02/doc-iiznezxr9459573.shtml.
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banks, UnionPay (a Chinese bank payment association), and third-party
payment service providers attempted to expand their market shares in mobile
payments. 7 Nevertheless, the development of mobile payments at that time
was limited by the lack of clear market regulations, the incompatibility of
mobile payment technology standards, the low penetration rate of smart
mobile devices, and poor mobile internet coverage. 8
To better regulate the mobile payment market, the People’s Bank of
China (“PBOC”), China’s central bank, issued “The Measures of
Administration of Payment Services by Non-financial Institutions” 9 in 2010,
defining the entry barrier for non-financial institutions to engage in mobile
payment services. 10 In 2011, the PBOC issued the first batch of licences to
twenty-seven third-party payment service providers. 11 The two giant
payment service providers, Alipay and WeChat Pay, which were among the
first group of licensed third-party mobile payment service providers, started
to provide cheap payment services allowing merchants to make use of a
simple printout of a QR code rather than an expensive card reader.12 At the
same time, the rapid growth of the Online-To-Offline market in ride-hailing
and food delivery created abundant small-ticket payment scenarios and
further advanced the wide application of mobile payments. 13
Against this backdrop, China’s mobile payment market has skyrocketed
since2013. By the end of June 2018, China had roughly 890 million mobile
payment users, and 2018’s total value of mobile payment transactions
reached 277.39 trillion yuan. 14

7. Guojia xinxi zhongxin (国家信息中心) [St. Info. Ctr.], “Zhongguo yidong zhifu fazhan
baogao”
(中国移动支付发展报告)
[CHINA
MOBILE
PAYMENT
Dev.
REP.]
(2019),
http://upload.xinhua08.com/2019/0508/1557302957552.pdf.
8. APFOC, supra Note 2, at 9.
9. PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, “Feijinrong jigou zhifu fuwu guanli banfa” (非金融机构支付服务
管理办法) [THE MEASURES OF ADMIN. of Payment Servs. by NON-FIN. INSTS.] (, June 14, 2010)
(effective September 1, 2010), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2010-06/21/content_1632796.htm (last accessed
June 15, 2021).
10. Id., Articles 8-10; APFOC, supra note 2, at 9.
11. APFOC, supra note 2, at 9.
12. Id.
13. APFOC, supra note 2, AT 9–10.;.
14. Guojia, supra note 6, at 8.
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Figure 1: Total Value of Mobile Payment Transaction Processed by Banking
Institutions in China, 2013-2018 (trillion yuan)
Source: State Information Centre, “China Mobile Payment Development
Report” (2019). 15
While mobile payments bring significant benefits to society, they are
not without risks. In 2018, the Jiangsu Provincial Committee for the
Protection of Consumers’ Rights and Interests filed an action on behalf of
consumers against Beijing Baidu Netcom Science Technology Co. Ltd on
the basis that the mobile applications breached the users’ data privacy.16 The
committee believed that the two mobile applications developed by Baidu,
“Mobile Baidu” and “Baidu Browser” hoovered up various types of personal
information, including sensitive information such as users’ location, their
MMS messages and contact lists, from users without informing them of the
privacy policy or obtaining their consent. 17 Later on, Baidu approached the
committee and offered to rectify the privacy issues of their mobile
applications. 18

15. Id.
16. SINA, Baidu was sued for breach of privacy right (Jan. 06, 2018, 01:20 am),
http://tech.sina.com.cn/roll/2018-01-06/doc-ifyqiwuw7106698.shtml.
17. Id.
18. THE PAPER, Jiangsu Consumer Protection Commission withdrew the lawsuit against Baidu
for breaching of consumer privacy: APP rectification and reform in place (Mar. 13, 2018, 10:28 am),
https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2028107.
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The Security Research Institute of China Academy of Information and
Communications, an affiliate of the Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology (MIIT), investigated more than 200 mobile applications in 2019
and found a massive prevalence of data privacy issues – 67% of mobile
applications in the market contain no less than 5 data privacy risks, and
18.5% of the mobile applications in the market carry at least 10 data privacy
risks. 19 Resulting problems include non-transparent data privacy policies,
unauthorised collection and sharing of personal information, and extensive
harvesting of personal information. 20 Some mobile applications offering
financial services collect more than 14 types of personal information, which
far exceeds the scope of data collection necessary to provide services. 21
These problems could cause identity theft, cyber fraud, price discrimination,
target advertising, and pervasive monitoring. 22 In summary, China must
urgently address how to protect data privacy for mobile payments.
2.2 Factors behind the Heightened Privacy Risk
The following section will discuss the main factors that contribute to
the data privacy risk faced by the mobile payment users. Particularly, the
new and heightened privacy risks are mostly caused by the involvement of
multiple players and their extensive collection of personal information used
in the course of mobile payments.
2.2.1 More Players in Mobile Payments
First, there are more players involved in mobile payments than in
traditional payment services. In general, the players of traditional payments
include banks (including, in the case of card payments, the issuing bank,
which provides the card to the consumer, and the acquiring bank, which is
used by the merchant or seller) and payment processors who process
payments by acting on behalf of acquiring or issuing banks. 23 Customers can
use their individual bank accounts through electronic channels by swiping
their cards, which usually involves “account-based electronic payment

19. Zhongguo xinxi tongxin yanjiuyuan anquan yanjiusuo (中国信息通信研究院安全研究所)
[SEC.RES. INST. CHINA ACAD. OF INFO. COMMC’Ns.], “Yidong yingyong shuju anquan yu geren xinxi
baohu baipishu” (移动应用数据安全与个人信息保护白皮书) [WHITE PAPER ON MOBILE
APPLICATION DATA SECURITY AND PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION] 10 (December, 2019),
http://www.caict.ac.cn/kxyj/qwfb/bps/201912/P020191230332039577332.pdf.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 14.
22. Id.
23. OECD, supra note 5, at 9.

234

CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.

Vol 20:2

services”. 24 There is only one simple and direct contractual relationship
between licensed banks and customers under the traditional bank payment
system.
By comparison, mobile payments use mobile devices instead of
physical plastic cards in a transaction, and thus many more actors are
involved, including “consumer facing” actors and “behind the scenes”
actors. 25 In addition to banks and payment processors, mobile payment
services often involve new actors such as mobile payment service providers,
mobile application developers, data analytics companies, e-commerce
platform operators, hardware manufacturers, and mobile network
operators. 26 For example, in the case of the mobile payment platform, the
mobile payment platform will act as a middleman to transfer money from the
customer’s account to the merchant’s account provided that both sides have
registered their bank cards in the platform. 27 From a legal perspective, there
could be two separate contractual relationships, one between customers and
mobile payment service providers, 28 , the other between banks and the
mobile payment service providers. With so many parties involved in
processing mobile payments, the risk of data leakage and abuse becomes
significantly higher.
2.2.2 More Extensive Collection of Data
The privacy risk is further amplified by the extensive collection of
personal data. In a typical credit card transaction, the parties to the
transaction have a limited understanding of the sales. 29 Merchants may know
the names of customers and the products that the customers purchase.30The
traditional payment networks receive limited information from transactions,
such as the account numbers, the amounts of fees and the identities of

24. Khiaonarong Tanai, Oversight Issues in Mobile Payments 6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. 14, 123).
25. Edith Ramirez, Opening Remarks at FTC Privacy Conference (2017), FTC PRIVACY
CONFERENCE 2–3, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1049653/ramirez__privacycon_remarks_1-12-17.pdf.
26. OECD, CONSUMER POLICY GUIDANCE ON MOBILE AND ONLINE PAYMENTS 10 (2014),
https://www.caa.go.jp/policies/policy/consumer_policy/international_affairs/pdf/150415adjustments_2.
pdf.
27. YONG WANG, CHRISTEN HAHN AND KRUTTIKA SUTRAVE, “MOBILE PAYMENT
SECURITY, THREATS, AND CHALLENGES” 3, https://par.nsf.gov/servlets/purl/10042755.
28. Congdon Stephen, What’s in Your Wallet: Addressing the Regulatory Grey Area Surrounding
Mobile Payments, 7 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 95, 99 (2016).
29. CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, JENNIFER M URBAN, AND SU LI, MOBILE PAYMENTS: CONSUMER
BENEFITS & NEW PRIVACY CONCERNS 5 (April 24, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2045580.
30. Id. at 5-6.
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merchants. 31 The banks usually only receive information on the total amount
of purchases and the places of purchase. The issuing banks will also know
the identities of consumers. 32
However, the nature of mobile devices makes mobile payment users
susceptible to data harvesting;as mobile devices contain multiple sensors
(such as cameras, microphones, movement sensors, GPS, and Wi-Fi
capabilities), they can generate various sensitive personal data, such as facial
images, voices, and information of geographical locations. 33 Mobile devices
can also be “physically tracked via their wireless interfaces by third-parties”
or “tracked by third-parties on the Internet,” 34 and data brokers could easily
track our IP address, location, behavioural habits, purchase habits, and other
online activities. Moreover, as mobile devices are always turned on,
connected to the internet and carried around by the users, it means that data
brokers could continuously and pervasively monitor users. 35
Extensive data harvesting is one of the key defining features of Big
Data, a powerful technique “that aids in the collection and mathematical
analysis of data, using traditional statistical methods as well as more
innovative analytical tools.” 36 Many internet companies, such as Google,
Facebook, and Amazon, have monetised Big Data. They harvest large
amounts of personal data, exploiting them for target advertising and training
“its search algorithms, and develop new data-intensive services such as voice
recognition, translation, and location-based services.” 37 These services can
generate new revenue. 38 Big Data also intensifies the issue of profiling. 39
For instance, it allows advertisers to use the information to create detailed
profiles of individual consumers and direct tailored advertisements to
consumers based on the data collected. 40

31. Id. at 6.
32. Id.
33. EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY (ENISA), PRIVACY
AND DATA PROTECTION IN MOBILE APPLICATIONS: A STUDY ON THE APP DEVELOPMENT ECOSYSTEM AND
THE TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF GDPR 11 (2017).
34. Id. at 12.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Yann Padova, Regime Change: Enabling Big Data through
Europe’s New Data Protection Regulation, 17 COLUMBIA SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 315, 318 (2016); as to
the feature of Big Data, see Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3(2)
INT’L DATA PRIV. L., 74, 77 (2013).
37. Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3(2) INT’L DATA PRIV.
L., 74, 76 (2013). .
38. Id. at 76.
39. Id. at 77.
40. CHARLES GIBNEY, et al., INTERNATIONAL REVIEW: MOBILE PAYMENTS AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION
iv
(2015),
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/canada/financial-consumer-
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Although providing consumers with advertisements customised to their
taste and preference, profiling has caused a series of significant problems.
First, data profiling often takes the form of “pervasive and non-transparent
commercial observation” of consumer online behaviour. 41 Profiling directly
interferes with consumers’ rights to personal data protection, such as the
right to notice and right to give consent before data collection 42
Second, by aggregating discrete or de-identified data sets, data profiling
can generate personally identifiable information that is ultimately linked to
individual users. 43 One possibility is that profiling can “generate a predictive
model of what has a high probability of being [personally identifiable
information].” 44 For example, in 2012, a New York Times articlecriticised
Target for using data mining techniques to analyse their customers’ purchase
history and to predict which female customers were pregnant. 45 After
inferential analysis, Target disclosed the relevant information to marketers
who then directed relevant advertisements to those pregnant women. 46 The
data analytics thus resulted in the unauthorised disclosure of sensitive
personal information and the direct invasion of consumers’ privacy. 47
Third, by aggregating data of consumers’ purchase histories, profiling
enables merchants to use unfair commercial practices, such as price
discrimination between different groups of consumers. 48
Fourth, target advertising may infringe consumers’ liberty and
autonomy as marketers may likely manipulate the consumers unaware of the
profiling activities. 49 This risk acutely affects vulnerable people targeted by
promotions of unhealthy food, medication, or high-interest consumer
loans. 50 Profiling can even be used in politics to manipulate voters. In March
2018, Cambridge Analytica collected data from more than 50 million
Facebook users without their consent to build their profiles and tailor
agency/migration/eng/resources/researchsurveys/documents/internationalreviewmobilepaymentsandcon
sumerprotection.pdf.
41. NJ King and P.W. Jessen, Profiling the Mobile Customer – Privacy Concerns When
Behavioural Advertisers Target Mobile Phones Part I” 26 COMP. L. & SEC.REV. 455, 459 (2010).
42. Id. at 459.
43. Paul Schwartz and Dan Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally
Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1841-42 (2001).
44. Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress
Predictive Privacy Harms 55 BOSTON COLLEGE L. REV. 93, 98 (2014).
45. Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, February 19, 2012.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. King & Jessen, supra note 29, at 459.
49. Karen Yeung, Five Fears About Mass Predictive Personalization in An Age of Surveillance
Capitalism 8(3) INT’L DATA PROT. L. 258, 262–63 (2018).
50. King & Jessen, supra note 29, at 461.; for a comprehensive discussion, see Ryan Calo, Digital
Market Manipulation 82 GEORGE WASHINGTON L. REV. 996 (2014).
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political advertisements to potential voters so as to influence their voting. 51
This infringement quickly aroused worldwide outrage. 52 The FTC eventually
settled with Facebook and imposed a record-breaking US$5 billion penalty
on Facebook. 53
In summary, the data-driven economy incentivises extensive data
harvesting and relentless data profiling against mobile payment consumers.
Balancing the need to protect consumer privacy with supporting financial
and technological innovation has become extremely challenging.
3. CHINA’S REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF DATA PROTECTION
3.1 The Historical Progression
In China, data privacy of mobile payments generally is regulated under
a broad framework of data protection. This framework has undergone a
structural evolution from a traditional and piecemeal approach to a principlebased approach by consolidating the fragmented data protection-related
provisions and systematising the data protection regime.
3.1.1 Before 2016: A Traditional and Piecemeal Approach
Before 2016, there was no general data protection law but traces of data
protection could be found in different laws. The Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China makes reference to privacy once, stating that citizens’
private correspondence is protected, and no organisation or individual may,
on any ground, infringe upon the freedom and privacy of citizens’
correspondence, except in cases to meet the needs of the state security or of
the investigation into criminal offences, public security and so forth.54
Article 38 also states that citizens’ personal dignity is inviolable.55 However,

51. Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore and Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump Consultants
Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions”, N.Y. TIMES, March 17 2018.
52. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint against Facebook, alleging that
Facebook violated the FTC’s 2012 order by misrepresenting the control that the users had over their
personal information, failing to institute and maintain a reasonable program to ensure consumers’ privacy,
and deceptively failing to disclose that it would use the users’ phone numbers for target advertising, see
U.S. v. Facebook, 456 F. Supp. 3d 115 (D.D.C. 2020).
53. FTC, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook
(July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penaltysweeping-new-privacy-restrictions
54. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa (中华人民共和国宪法) [Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the National People’s Congress on 4 December 1982, effective from
4 December 1982; amended in 1988, 1993, 1999, 2004 and 2018) (hereinafter China Constitution),
Article 40.
55. China Constitution, Article 38.
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these constitutional rights may not directly relate to data protection since
they cannot directly serve as the legal ground for a judicial decision. 56
China’s civil and criminal laws protect individuals’ right to privacy.
The Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China 57 (“Tort Liability
Law”), which came into effect in July 2010, recognises the right to privacy
as an independent civil right. 58 Article 36 protects individuals’ civil rights
and interests from online infringement.59 Individuals thus have a cause of
action in tort against tortfeasors if their right to privacy is infringed. The
Ninth adopted version of Amendments to the Criminal Law of the People’s
Republic of China (Criminal Law) contains several important severe
prohibitions relating to data protection. 60 It imposes severe punishment for
the illegal activities of (i) selling or providing citizens’ personal information
to third parties, and (ii) selling or providing to third parties citizens’ personal
information obtained during the course of performing duties or providing
services. 61 Network service providers may face criminal liability if they fail
to fulfill “information network security administration duties prescribed by
laws or administrative regulations” or take remedial action. 62
In December 2012, the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress (NPCSC) promulgated “The Decision on Strengthening Online
Information Protection” (2012 NPSCS Decision). 63 2012 NPSCS Decision
sets out several basic principles on data protection and acts as the primary
baseline for the subsequent privacy regulation in China. 64 Article 2 specifies
that network service providers shall “abide by the principles of legality,
legitimacy and necessity, clearly indicate the objective, methods and scope
for collection and use of information, and obtain consent from the person
56. Tong Zhiwei, A comment on the rise and fall of the Supreme People’s Court’s reply to Qi
Yuling’s case 43 SUFFOLK U. L. Rev. 669, 677–78 (2010) (pointing out that “China is a state of statutory
laws and any provision of constitutional rights must be implemented through laws made by legislative
bodies; otherwise, the constitutionally recognized rights cannot be practically protected.”)
57. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo qinquan zerenfa (中华人民共和国侵权责任法) [Tort Liability
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress on 26 December 2009, effective from 1 July 2010) (hereinafter Tort Liability Law).
58. Tort Liability Law, Article 2.
59. Tort Liability Law, Article 36.
60. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa Xiuzhengan (9) (中华人民共和国刑法修正案九) [The
Ninth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress on 29 August 2015, effective from 1 November 2015) (hereinafter Criminal
Law).
61. Criminal Law, Article 17.
62. Criminal Law, Article 28.
63. “Guanyu jiaqiang wangluo xinxi baohu de guiding” (关于加强网络信息保护的决定) [The
Decision on Strengthening Online Information Protection] (promulgated by the NPSCS on 28 December
2012, effective from 28 December 2012) (hereinafter 2012 NPSCS Decision).
64. GRAHAM GREENLEAF, ASIAN DATA PRIVACY LAWS: TRADE & HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES
204 (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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whose data is collected.” 65 Following this decision, China continuously
develops the regime of personal data protection by making and amending
laws and regulations in various economic sectors. 66
In addition to the general laws, the PBOC paid close attention to the
issue of data privacy in the financial industry. In 2011, the PBOC issued a
circular to the banking industry on the issue of protecting personal financial
information. 67 This circular laid down a foundation for the PBOC’s future
regulation of data privacy protection. For example, the circular requires that
banks must establish internal control systems to ensure the confidentiality of
personal financial information, and banks should not collect information
irrelevant to their service. 68 In March 2012, the PBOC issued another circular
requiring banks to strengthen the protection of data privacy in accordance
with laws and regulations. 69
The above circulars were only applicable to banks. In December 2015,
the PBOC issued another regulation to rein in the rapid growth of mobile
payments. 70 First, non-bank payment institutions must establish an internal
data management and risk control system.71 Second, the payment institutions
must not store certain sensitive information, such as magnetic track
information and chip information of bank cards, account passwords, and card
verification codes. 72 Third, without consent of clients and banks, payment
institutions must not store the expiration date of bank cards.73 They also must
not provide other organisations with clients’ information unless otherwise
authorised by law or approved by the clients. 74 Last but not least, they should
65. 2012 NPSCS Decision, Article 2.
66. China also updated the Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests (Consumer
Protection Law) in 2013: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xiaofeizhe quanyibaohufa (中华人民共和国消
费者权益保护法) [Consumer Rights Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated
by the NPCSC on 31 October 1993, effective from 1 January 1994; amended in 2009 and 2013).
67. Guanyu yinhangye jinrong jigou zuohao geren jinrong xinxi baohu gongzuo de tongzhi” (关于
银行业金融机构做好个人金融信息保护工作的通知) [Circular of the People’s Bank of China on the
Protection of personal Financial Information by Bank and Financial Institutions] (issued by the People’s
Bank of China on 21 January 2011, effective from 1 May 2011).
68. Id.
69. Guanyu yinhangye jinrong jigou jinyibu zuohao geren jinrong xinxi baohu gongzuo de tongzhi
(关于银行业金融机构进一步做好个人金融信息保护工作的通知) [Circular of the People’s Bank of
China on the Further Protection of personal Financial Information by Bank and Financial Institutions]
(issued by the People’s Bank of China on 27 March 2012, effective from 27 March 2012).
70. “Feiyinhang Zhifu Jigou Wangluo zhifu yewu guanli banfa” (非银行支付机构网络支付业务
管理办法) [The Management Measures of the Mobile Payment Business of the Non-bank Payment
Institutions] (issued by the People’s Bank of China on 28 December 2015, effective from 28 December
2015) (hereinafter Mgmt. Measures).
71. Mgmt. Measures, Article 20.
72. Mgmt. Measures, Article 20.
73. Mgmt. Measures, Article 20.
74. Mgmt. Measures, Article 20.
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comply with the principles of minimisation when collecting and processing
the clients’ information and should also inform clients of the scope and
purpose of data collection and processing. 75
3.1.2 After 2016: A Comprehensive and Proactive Regime
The Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China
(Cybersecurity Law), enacted in November 2016, is thus far the most
important and comprehensive law relating to data protection. 76 Although the
major purpose of this law is to reduce the risk of cyberattacks and safeguard
national security, it reiterates the basic requirements in the 2012 NPSCS
Decision, articulates a set of data protection principles, specifies the data
subject’s rights, and stipulates penalties for violations of the law. 77
The Cybersecurity Law is accompanied by the Personal Information
Security Specification (2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision)), a
comprehensive guide setting out the compliance requirements of data
protection. 78 The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) is a nationally
recommended standard. Under Article 2 of the Standardisation Law of the
People’s Republic of China, the national standards are divided into
mandatory standards and recommended standards; while mandatory
standards must be implemented, recommended standards are simply
recommended for implementation.79 As such, the 2018 SAMR Specification
(2020 Revision) is not mandatory. However, it can act as a regulatory
baseline for judicial and law enforcement authorities as well as companies
to determine compliance with the requirements of data protection. 80 In
addition, we believe that it may reflect the direction of future legislation on
data protection.
Following the enactment of the Cybersecurity Law, the PBOC issued
an implementing rule for the financial industry, titled “Measures for the
75. Mgmt. Measures, Article 20.
76. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wangluo anquan fa (中华人民共和国网络安全法)
[Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the NPCSC on 7 November
2016, effective from 1 June 2017) (hereinafter Cybersecurity Law).
77. Cybersecurity Law, Article 41.
78. Xinxi anquan jishu – Geren xinxi anquan guifan (信息安全技术 —— 个人信息安全规范)
[Information Security Technology – Personal Information Security Specification] (issued by State
Administration of Market Supervision and Administration and National Standardisation Management
Committee on 29 December 2017, effective from 1 May 2018; amended in 2019 and 2020) (hereinafter
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision)).
79. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo biaozhunhua fa (中华人民共和国标准化法) [Standardisation
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the NPCSC on 29 December 1988, effective
from 1 April 1989; amended in 2017), Article 2.
80. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 1.
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Protection of the Rights and Interests of Financial Consumers”. 81 It imposes
the obligations of data privacy protection on financial institutions. According
to Article 2, financial institutions include banks and other financial
institutions providing cross-market and cross-industry financial products and
services, as well as non-bank payment institutions. 82 Chapter 3, on data
privacy protection, defines “personal financial information” as “the personal
information obtained, processed and preserved by financial institutions in the
course of ordinary business or through other channels, which includes the
information of personal identity, asset, account, credit, transaction and other
information that can reflect certain situations of individuals.” 83 It reiterates
the key principles for data protection laid out in the Cybersecurity Law. For
instance, Article 28 states that when collecting personal financial
information, financial institutions shall follow the principles of legality,
reasonableness and necessity, collect personal financial information in
accordance with the requirements of laws and regulations and business
needs, and not collect information which is irrelevant to business, collect
information in an improper manner, or illegally store personal financial
information. 84
In line with the 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), the PBOC
issued “Personal Financial Information Protection Technical Specification”
(2020 PBOC Specification) in February 2020. 85 Similar to the role of the
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), the 2020 PBOC Specification
sets out the best practice for data privacy protection. It classifies personal
financial information and sets forth various requirements governing the
different categories of the data. As the 2020 PBOC Specification basically
incorporates the framework of the 2018 SAMR Specification (2020
Revision), the 2020 PBOC Specification will be discussed only to the extent
necessary to avoid repetition.
In September 2020, the PBOC also updated “Measures for the
Protection of the Rights and Interests of Financial Consumers” in accordance

81. Zhongguo renmin yinhang jinrong xiaofeizhe quanyi baohu shishi banfa (中国人民银行金融
消费者权益保护实施办法) [Measures of the People’s Bank of China for the Protection of the Rights
and Interests of Financial Consumers] (issued by the People’s Bank of China on 14 December 2016,
effective from 14 December 2016) (hereinafter PBC Protection).
82. PBC Protection, Article 2.
83. PBC Protection, Article 27.
84. PBC Protection, Article 28.
85. Geren jinrong xinxi baohu jishu guifan (个人金融信息保护技术规范) [Personal Financial
Information Protection Technical Specification] (issued by the People’s Bank of China on 13 February
2020).
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with the Cybersecurity Law and the 2020 PBOC Specification. 86 It adds the
requirements of disclosure, data breach notification and data classification.
In addition to the various rule-making efforts, the PBOC also
endeavoured to improve the financial infrastructure to provide adequate
technical support for data protection. In 2017, the PBOC instructed the
Payment and Clearing Association of China to establish a unified payment
clearing platform for non-bank payment institutions. 87 By doing so, the
PBOC can monitor information on mobile payment transactions, regulate
relevant financial activities, and deal with the risks of money-laundering.
3.2 Main Elements of Current Regulatory Regime
3.2.1 Concept of Personal Information
In general, there are two groups of payment data collected and
processed in mobile payments: Essential payment data and ancillary data.88
Essential payment data includes payer personal, account, and transaction
data. 89
Therefore, the starting point of considering China’s current regulatory
regime in the area of mobile payment is the concept of personal information.
In other words, the first question is which kinds of personal information are
protected under the regulatory regime. The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020
Revision) expressly expands the scope of personal information, referring to
“any information that is recorded, electronically or otherwise, can be used
solely or in combination with other information to identify the identity of a
natural person or reflect the activities of a natural person.”90 Arguably, this
definition may extend to cover “the information that may reflect a specific
person (without necessarily identifying them).” 91 If this is the case, the 2018
86. Zhongguo renmin yinhang jinrong xiaofeizhe quanyi baohu shishi banfa” (中国人民银行金融
消费者权益保护实施办法) [Measures for the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Financial
Consumers of the People’s Bank of China] (issued by the People’s Bank of China on 15 September 2020,
effective from 1 November 2020).
87. “Zhongguo renmin yinhang zhifujiesuan si guanyu jiang feiyinhang zhifu jigou wangluo zhifu
yewu you zhilian moshi qianyi zhi wanglian pingtai chuli de tongzhi” 中国人民银行支付结算司关于
将非银行支付机构网络支付业务由直连模式迁移至网联平台处理的通知 [Notice on Migrating the
Online Payment Business of Non-bank Payment Institutions from Direct Connection Mode to Network
Platform Processing] (issued by the People’s Bank of China on 4 Aug 2017).
88. PAYMENT SYSTEM REGULATOR (UK), DATA IN THE PAYMENTS INDUSTRY 17 (2018),
https://www.psr.org.uk/publications/consultations/discussion-paper-data-in-the-payments-industry/ (last
visited June 15, 2021).
89. Id.
90. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 3.1.
91. Greenleaf Graham and Livingston Scott, China’s Personal Information Standard: The Long
March to a Privacy Law, 150 PRIV. L. & BUS. Int’l REP. 25, 26 (2017).
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SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) would apply not only to the personally
identifiable information but also to information “which gives an organisation
the capacity to interact with a person on an individuated basis (such as
behavioural target marketing using data) which does not enable the [data
controller] to identify the data subject.” 92
The 2020 PBOC Specification applies to the personal financial
information, which is defined as “personal information collected, processed
and stored through the financial products and services by the financial
institutions.” 93 This essentially incorporates the concept of personal
information set out in the 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision).
Additionally, the 2020 PBOC Specification grades the personal financial
information into three categories, namely C1, C2 and C3, according to the
nature and level of sensitivity of the information.
The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) distinguishes general
personal data from sensitive personal data. Sensitive personal data is defined
as “personal data that, if disclosed or illegally processed, might endanger
personal and property security, damage personal reputation, or physical or
psychological health, or lead to discriminatory treatment and so forth.” 94 In
this respect, C2 and C3 fall within the category of sensitive personal data.
Accordingly, the enhanced protective mechanisms for sensitive information
under the 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) should also be applied,
such as explicit consent from data subjects before collection,95 encryption
storage and transmission of sensitive information, 96 and special controls of
accessing sensitive information. 97
3.2.2 Data Controllers and Data Processors
As discussed above, the 2020 PBOC Specification imposes upon
financial institutions the obligations of protecting data privacy and
cybersecurity. The term “financial industry institutions (jin rong ye ji gou)”
refers to licensed financial institutions regulated by the authorities and the
relevant institutions involved in the processing of personal financial
information. 98 The licensed financial institutions include banks, non-bank
payment institutions, and licensed financial service companies. The relevant
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
2020 PBOC Specification, Section 3.2
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 3.2.
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 5.4(b).
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 6.3(a).
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 7.1(e).
2020 PBOC Specification, Section 3.1
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institutions involved in the processing of financial information may include
telecommunication service providers, information technology providers and
marketing service providers. In fact, these entities, according to the 2018
SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) which will be discussed below, can be
categorised into two types: data controllers and data processors.
The Cybersecurity Law imposes upon the network operators the legal
responsibility for complying with the respective data protection obligations.
Network operators refer to the owners and administrators of networks as well
as network service providers. 99 This loosely-defined term would encompass
almost all the business that owns or administrates networks. The 2018
SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) provides a more specific concept “data
controller.” Data controller means “any organization or person that has the
power to decide the purpose and method of processing personal
information.” 100 It is the data controller that has the obligation to comply
with the respective requirements. In light of the increasingly important role
of the data outsourcing services, the 2018 SAMR Specification (2020
Revision) also makes a distinction between a data controller and a third-party
data processor. The delegation of data processing by the data controller to
the data processor should be within the data subject’s authorisation. 101 The
data processor should strictly follow the data controller’s instructions. 102
In the context of mobile payment, a merchant can be seen as a data
controller of the purchase data that he processes for a sales agreement.103 A
bank is also a data controller of its customers’ financial information. 104 A
payment processor is likely to be a processor as it operates on behalf of the
issuing or acquiring bank to evaluate whether transactions are valid. A
mobile payment application developer can act in both capacities. It can be a
processor if the mobile application is developed at the request and on behalf
of a bank or financial institution to facilitate contactless payments. 105 On the
other hand, if the developer retains access to personal data to provide
additional services, such as tailored advertisements, it qualifies as a
controller as well. 106 Both e-commerce platform providers and mobile
payment service providers are, by definition, data controllers, and a third99. Cybersecurity Law, Article 76(3).
100. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 3.4.
101. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 9.1(a).
102. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 9.1(c).
103. SIMONT BRAUN, “MOBILE WALLETS AND MOBILE CONTACTLESS PAYMENTS –
A CLOSER LOOK AT DATA PROTECTION”, https://www.simontbraun.eu/images/pdf/News/
NFC_News_II_versie_21mei_2015_2_2.pdf
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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party service provider for authentication of users or personalised
advertisement is a data processor dealing with data on behalf of the data
controller. Therefore, in mobile payments, data controllers may include
merchants, banks and non-bank payment service providers, mobile payment
application developers and e-commerce platform providers. Data processors
may include payment processors, mobile payment application developers,
third-party service providers.
Before engaging a third party as the data processor, the data controller
should carry out a personal information security impact assessment, ensuring
that the data processor has sufficient data security capabilities and provides
sufficient security safeguards. 107 The data controller should also supervise
the data processor and record the processor’s activities. 108 In addition to the
general requirements, the financial institutions are not allowed to authorise
a non-financial institution to collect C2 or C3-level personal financial
information. 109 They may not authorise a third-party to process any C2 or
C3-level personal financial information that supports user authentication
(e.g. one-time password or a SMS code). 110 The information to be outsourced
should be de-identified. 111 The data processor has a number of direct
obligations, including strictly following the data controller’s instructions,
obtaining its authorisation before engaging a sub-processor and deleting all
personal data at the end of the engagement. 112
3.2.3 Principles of Fair Information Practices
The fundamental principles of data protection under the Cybersecurity
Law and the 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) are based on the
Fair Information Practices (FIPs). The 2020 PBOC Specification reiterates
these principles. The FIPs originated from a 1973 report by the United States
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and it became extremely
influential in shaping privacy law in the United States and around the
world. 113 The Cybersecurity Law incorporated several key principles of the
FIPs, including the principles of lawfulness, fairness and transparency,
integrity and confidentiality, data minimisation and data subjects’
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 9.1(b).
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 9.1(d).
2020 PBOC Specification, Section 6.1.1(a).
2020 PBOC Specification, Section 6.1.4.4 (b).
2020 PBOC Specification, Section 6.1.4.4 (c).
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 9.1(c).
For a history of the FIPs, see, ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC
HISTORY (October 7, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2415020; Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy
Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARVARD L. REV. 1966 (2013).
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participation. The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) further
introduces the principles of purpose limitation, accuracy, and storage
limitation.
The Cybersecurity Law states that the network operators should abide
by the principles of lawfulness, fairness, and necessity. 114 Under the 2018
SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), the principle of lawfulness means that
data controllers shall not deceive, trick, or coerce data subjects to provide
personal information, or conceal the data collection functions of their
products or services, or obtain data from illegal channels. 115 The principle of
necessity is closely connected with the principle of data minimisation. Under
the Cybersecurity Law, “network operators must not collect personal
information unrelated to the services they provide.” 116 The 2018 SAMR
Specification (2020 Revision) modifies this with a stricter approach,
requiring that “the type of personal information collected should be directly
related to the business function of the product or service; it means that the
function of the product or service cannot be realized without the participation
of the above personal information.” 117 In addition, “the frequency of
automatic collection of personal information should be the minimum
frequency necessary to realize the business function of the product or
service,” 118 and “the amount of indirect acquisition of personal information
should be the minimum necessary to realize the business function of the
product or service.” 119
Furthermore, the Cybersecurity Law requires network operators to
“make public rules for collection and use, explicitly stating the purposes,
means, and scope for collecting or using information, and obtaining the
consent of the person whose data is gathered.” 120 This principle of
transparency aims to keep data subjects informed about how their data are
being used and offset the asymmetry of information between the data
controllers and data subjects. The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020
Revision) further requires that the scope, purposes, and rules of data
processing should be open to the public in an explicit, intelligible, reasonable
and accessible manner. 121 The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision)
also spreads out the particular consent requirements. It prohibits the seeking
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Cybersecurity Law, Article 41.
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 5.1.
Cybersecurity Law, Article 41.
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 5.2(a).
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 5.2(b).
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 5.2(c).
Cybersecurity Law, Article 41.
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Sections 5.5(b)-(d).
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of bundle consent and forced consent. 122 An individual’s express consent
through opt-in or other affirmative action is required to collect sensitive
personal data, and such consent must be fully informed and involve a clear
and definitive expression of intent. 123
The Cybersecurity Law does not contain the principle of purpose
limitation. The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) introduces this
principle, stipulating that “the use of personal information should not exceed
the scope that is directly or reasonably related to the purpose claimed at the
time of the collection of personal information.” 124 The 2018 SAMR
Specification (2020 Revision) also introduces the requirement of storage
limitation, stating that “the storage period of personal information should be
the minimum time necessary to achieve the purpose authorized by the data
subject,” 125 and the data must be erased or anonymised when those purposes
have been served. 126
The Cybersecurity Law requires that ”network operators shall strictly
maintain the confidentiality of user information they collect, and establish
and complete user information protection systems.” 127 It further requires that
network operators shall adopt technical measures and other necessary
measures to ensure the security of personal information. 128 In the case of data
breaches, remedial measures shall be immediately taken, and the network
operators shall promptly inform the users and to make a report to the
competent departments in accordance with regulations. 129 The 2018 SAMR
Specification (2020 Revision) also requires that an incident notification must
explain the nature and impact of the incident, the measures taken or to be
taken in response, the practical recommendations for data subjects to
minimise the impact of the incident, and the data subjects’ rights and
remedies. 130
The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) requires organisations
to employ enhanced security measures, such as de-identification of personal
information and encryption of sensitive personal data. 131 Likewise, under the
2020 PBOC Specification, financial institutions should use de-identification,
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 5.3(a).
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 5.4(b).
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 7.3.
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 6.1(a).
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 6.1(b).
Cybersecurity Law, Article 40.
Cybersecurity Law, Article 42.
Cybersecurity Law, Article 42.
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Sections 10.1 & 10.2.
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Sections 6.2 & 6.3.
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anonymisation or encryption where necessary to protect the personal
financial information after collection.132 The 2020 PBOC Specification
further specifies that the transmission of information in C2 or C3 categories
through a public network should be conducted through encrypted
channels. 133
Network operators are obligated to allocate persons responsible for
network security as part of their internal security management systems.134
The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) and the 2020 PBOC
Specification stipulate controllers’ duties of responsibility and
accountability. 135 Financial institutions should establish a specific unit
responsible for protecting financial information, 136 and exercise necessary
supervision of the responsible personnel. 137 For other entities acting as data
controllers, they are expected to designate a person or agent to manage
personal data. 138 If an organisation has more than 200 personnel and its main
business involves processing personal data, or if the organisation is expected
to handle the personal data of more than 1,000,000 people over the next 12
months, then it should establish a department with dedicated staff to handle
personal data security. 139
Under the Cybersecurity Law, data subjects can request network
operators to delete their personal information if individuals discover that
network operators have violated the provisions of laws, administrative
regulations or agreements between the parties to gather or use their personal
information. 140 The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) gives more
control to the data subjects; for instance, a data subject has the right to access
his information collected by the data controllers 141 and the right to rectify
inaccurate information. 142 Data subjects can revoke consent to data
processing, after which the data controller is not allowed to further process
the data. 143 The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) also reiterates
data subjects’ rights to delete information if the data controller has breached
its legal obligations or an agreement with the data subject. The same right
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

2020 PBOC Specification, Section 6.1.3.
2020 PBOC Specification, Section 6.1.3.
Cybersecurity Law, Article 21.
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 11; 2020 PBOC Specification, Section 7.2.
2020 PBOC Specification, Section 7.2.2.
2020 PBOC Specification, Section 7.2.3.
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 11.1(b).
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 11.
Cybersecurity Law, Article 43.
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 8.2.
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 8.2.
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 8.4(a).
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extends to information in the possession of data processors. 144 Personal data
should also be deleted or anonymised when users close down accounts. 145
3.2.4 Enforcement Mechanisms
Under the Cybersecurity Law, the Cyberspace Administration of China
is responsible for the overall planning and coordination of cybersecurity
work and related supervision and management work. 146 The implementation
of the Cybersecurity Law is left to the Public Security Bureau and the
MIIT. 147 While the Public Security Bureau is mainly responsible for the
investigation of criminal offences, the MIIT, as the chief internet and
telecommunication regulator, is responsible for dealing with privacy-related
complaints.
Apart from the general agencies for data protection, attention also needs
to be paid to the specialist financial regulators, particularly because mobile
payment represents a form of financial service. The current financial
regulatory structure in China has the defining feature of being sectorbased. 148 As the central bank, the PBOC assumes responsibility for monetary
policies and the stability of the national financial system generally. The
China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) and the
China Securities Regulatory Commission are the authorities responsible for
regulating the banking and insurance sectors and the securities sector
respectively. The banking sector is broadly defined to cover commercial
banks, non-bank financial institutions and trust companies.149 Hence, as nonbank financial institutions, mobile payment platforms are subject to the
regulation of both the PBOC and the CBIRC.
Individuals and organizations have the right to report conducts
endangering cybersecurity to relevant departments. 150 Cybersecurity refers
to the “capacity for network data to be complete, confidential and usable as
well as protecting them from attack.” 151 The relevant competent departments
may order the organisations to make corrections, and can, according to the
144. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 8.3.
145. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 8.5.
146. Cybersecurity Law, Article 8.
147. Cybersecurity Law, Article 8.
148. ROBIN HUI HUANG, SECURITIES AND CAPITAL MARKETS LAW IN CHINA 24–35 (Oxford
University Press, 2014).
149. Id. at 27–29; Robin Hui Huang, The Logics and Path of the Reform of China’s Financial
Regulatory Structure: International Experiences and Local Choice 2019(3) FAXUE JIA 124-137 (2019)
(discussing the development and function of the CBIRC).
150. Cybersecurity Law, Article 14.
151. Cybersecurity Law, Article 76(2).
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circumstances, confiscate any illegal income made and impose a fine of not
less than one time and not more than ten times the illegal gains. If there are
no illegal gains, a fine up to 1,000,000 yuan shall be imposed, and the person
in charge and other persons directly responsible shall be fined not less than
10,000 yuan but not more than 100,000 yuan. If the circumstances are
serious, the relevant departments can suspend the organisations’ relevant
business and revoke their business licenses. 152
In addition to administrative fines, private civil action is available for
individuals whose rights have been harmed. 153 An individual may file a claim
in tort if his right or interest has been infringed. 154 Network users and
network service providers may be required to make apologies and restore the
claimants’ reputation. 155 Where their violations cause “financial loss or
grave psychological harm”, the claimants can request compensation. 156
Where the loss or harm is not ascertainable, the courts may order damages
up to 500,000 yuan. 157
The Cybersecurity Law states that where any breaches of the law
constitute a crime, criminal responsibility will apply to the wrongdoers. 158
The Criminal Law which has been discussed above would apply.
4. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES
The internet landscape has changed profoundly over the past decades.
In the international arena, many jurisdictions are evaluating or reforming
their regulatory frameworks to protect consumers and respond to
technological innovation. In this part, we will examine the regulatory
frameworks of some major jurisdictions, including the United States, the
European Union, Singapore, and Hong Kong.
4.1 The United States
The United States (US) deals with data privacy on a sectoral basis.
There are no omnibus records of federal privacy statutes, and the method of
152. Cybersecurity Law, Article 64.
153. Cybersecurity Law, Article 74.
154. 0137.
155. Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli liyong xinxi wangluo qinhai renshenquanyi minshi jiufen
anjian shiyong falv ruogan wenti de guiding” (最高人民法院关于审理利用信息网络侵害人身权益民
事纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的规定)[Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues
Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Disputes over the Use of Information Network
to Infringe upon Personal Rights and Interests] (issued by Supreme People’s Court on 23 June 2014,
effective from 10 October 2014), Article 16 (hereinafter China’s Supreme Court Provisions) .
156. China’s Supreme Court Provisions, Article 17.
157. China’s Supreme Court Provisions, Article 18.
158. Cybersecurity Law, Article 74.
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protecting personal information depends on the specific category of the
information involved.
The categories covered under federal laws include, among others,
healthcare data (under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act) 159, financial data (under the Gramm Leach Bliley Act) 160, children’s
information (under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act) 161,
consumer credit data (under the Fair Credit Reporting Act) 162, electronic
communication data (under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act). 163
The FTC, which is the main regulatory body addressing privacy breaches 164,
fills in some of the statutory gaps by taking actions against unfair and
deceptive data protection practices. 165
The pertinent laws for mobile payment privacy protection include the
Gramm Leach Bliley Act and the FTC Act. 166 The Gramm Leach Bliley Act
imposes several obligations of protecting consumers’ non-public personal
information from financial institutions engaging in financial activities.
Financial institutions must provide consumers with “clear and conspicuous”
notice describing their privacy policies. 167 Financial institutions are
generally not allowed to share non-public personal information with nonaffiliated third parties unless they provide consumers with notice and an
option to opt-out, 168 nor can they share consumers’ financial information to
third parties for direct marketing. 169 Federal banking regulators are
responsible for supervising depository institutions, and the FTC regulates all
non-depository institutions. 170 Wrongdoers who knowingly and intentionally
obtain or disclose “customer information” through false or fraudulent
statements or representations will face criminal liability. 171
The FTC Act gives the FTC authority to take actions against unfair and
deceptive data protection practices. Generally speaking, an act or practice is
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(9).
160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809.
161. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
163. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2711, 3121–3126.
164. FTC,
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/ourdivisions/division-privacy-and-identity (last visited June 18, 2021).
165. FTC,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/
privacy-security-enforcement (last visited June 18, 2021); Daniel Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC
and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUMBIA L. REV. 583, 587 (2014).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 41.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a); 12 C.F.R. §§ 1016.4–1016.6.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b); 12 C.F.R. § 1016.10(a).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(d); 16 C.F.R. § 313.12(a).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a)(1)–(7).
171. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6821, 6823.
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unfair only if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” 172
As for the concept of “deceptive,” the FTC has clarified that an act or practice
is to be considered deceptive if it involves a material “representation,
omission, or practice that is likely to mislead [a] consumer” who is “acting
reasonably in the circumstances.” 173
Some scholars have pointed out that the FTC’s enforcement approach
is based on the principle of “common law” of privacy. 174 Crucial to this
principle is the idea of “notice and choice” where companies are required to
disclose their privacy policy enabling their users to make an informed
choice. 175 Companies are bound against deceiving others by their data
privacy and data security promises. 176 Companies act deceptively if they
make false representations in order to induce disclosure of personal
information, 177 or provide insufficient notice about their privacy practices. 178
The FTC can either bring administrative proceedings or civil proceedings. 179
But most actions initiated by the FTC are negotiated and settled through the
consent order procedures. 180 The FTC Act does not provide a right to private
action, nor does it provide a criminal sanction.
In addition, all 50 states have enacted data breach notification statutes
following the California Security Breach Notification Law with effect from
July 1, 2003, to establish data breach notification mechanisms. 181
4.2 The European Union
The right to data protection is one of the fundamental rights in the
European Union (EU). This right is believed to be grounded in the concept
172. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
173. FTC, POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION 1–2 (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/publicstatements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception (last visited June 19, 2021).
174. Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy 114
COLUMBIA L. REV. 583, 619 (2014).
175. FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 40 (2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-consumerprotection-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting-consumer/101201privacyreport.pdf (last visited June
15, 2021).
176. Solove and Woodrow, supra note 181, at 628.
177. Id. at 630.
178. Id. at 634.
179. Id. at 609.
180. Id. at 610.
181. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security(2018),
breach-notification-laws.aspx (last accessed June 20, 2021).
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of human dignity. 182 The stand-alone right to data protection marks one of
the major differences between the US and the EU in protecting personal
data. 183
The early history of the EU data protection law begins within individual
European countries, such as Sweden (1973), the Federal Republic of
Germany (1977), Austria (1978), Denmark (1978), France (1978), and
Norway (1978). 184 In 1995, the EU started to harmonise the data privacy law
and adopted the 95 Directive to protect the collection, use, process and
exchange of personal data based on the recommendation proposed by the
OECD. 185 The 95 Directive was replaced by the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) in 2018. 186
The key principles of data protection in the GDPR are specified in
Article 5, including the principles of lawfulness, fairness, transparency,
purpose limitation, data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity
and confidentiality, and accountability. The GDPR requires data controllers
and processors to have a lawful basis for processing personal data. These
legal bases include consent, performance of the contracts, compliance with
legal obligations, protection of the vital interests of the data subject or
another individual, tasks carried out in the public interest, and legitimate
interests of the controllers or a third party. 187 The individuals have the right
to be informed, right of access, right to rectification, right to be forgotten,
right to restrict processing, and right to data portability. 188 Data controllers
are required to implement a range of measures designed to ensure the
compliance with the GDPR, such as establishing GDPR-conforming
contracts with data processors, 189 maintaining records of processing

182. ORLA LYNSKEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW 242 (Oxford University
Press, 2015).
183. James Q. Whitman, “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty” (2004)
113 Yale Law Review 1151; Paul M. Schwartz, “The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions
and Procedures” (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 1966.
184. Colin J Bennett and Charles D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instrument in Global
Perspective (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2006), 127.
185. Summaries of EU Legislation, “Protection of Personal Data”, available at https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al14012
186. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1
[hereinfater GDPR].
187. GDPR, Article 6.
188. GDPR, Articles 12-23.
189. GDPR, Article 28(3).
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activities, 190 conducting impact assessments on personal data use, 191 and
appointing a data protection officer. 192
In the event of a personal data breach, the GDPR requires data
controllers to notify the relevant authorities of any breach within 72 hours of
discovering it. 193 The GDPR allows European data protection authorities to
fine companies up to the higher of €20 million or 4 percent of their global
turnover for the most severe category of data protection violations. 194
Individuals also have the right to lodge a complaint with regulatory
authorities. 195 They can seek an effective judicial remedy against data
controllers and processors, and obtain compensation for their damages
suffered. 196
The Payment Service Directive 2 (PSD2) 197 came into force on 12
January 2016, and the EU Member States were required to legislate it into
national law by 13 January 2018. 198 The European Commission considered
the PSD2 to be necessary to address the potential gaps in the regulatory
regime for payment services. In terms of data protection, there are
considerable overlaps between the PSD2 and the GDPR. The PSD2 reiterates
the application of the ‘principles of necessity, proportionality, purpose
limitation, and proportionate data retention period’ to payment service
providers. 199
It is worth noting that the PSD2 lays out stricter obligations of data
protection on third-party payment providers (including payment initiation
service providers and account information service providers). Under the
GDPR, personal data can only be collected for “specified, explicit and
legitimate purposes.” 200 By comparison, the PSD2 states that third-party
payment providers can only access, process and retain personal data
necessary for the provision of their payment services, with the explicit
consent of the payment service user. 201 They are not allowed to “use, access
190. GDPR, Article 30.
191. GDPR, Article 35.
192. GDPR, Article 37-39.
193. GDPR, Article 33.
194. GDPR, Article 83(5)-(6).
195. GDPR, Article 77.
196. GDPR, Articles 79 & 82.
197. Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015
on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and
2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC [2015] OJ L
337/35 [hereinafter PSD2] .
198. PSD2, Article 115(2).
199. PSD2, Recital 89.
200. PSD2, Article 5(1)(b).
201. PSD2, Article 94(2).
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or store any data for purposes other than for performing their service
explicitly requested by the customer.” 202 It essentially prohibits third-party
payment providers from collecting ancillary information, which is not
necessary for the service of payment or using the information for additional
marketing purposes.
Under the PSD2, payment service providers are required to notify their
home competent authority in the case of a “major operational or security
incident.” 203 Where the incident may have an impact on the financial
interests of payment service users, payment service providers must also
inform payment service users of the incident and requisite mitigation
measures without undue delay. 204
Additionally, the E-Privacy Directive 205 gives individuals specific
protections in relation to online-tracking issues, and it can be summarised as
follows. First, unsolicited marketing by phone, email, or other electronic
messages may only be allowed if consumers have given their prior
consent. 206 Secondly, service providers must obtain users’ active and clear
consent before setting cookies. 207 Thirdly, service providers must take
appropriate measures to safeguard the security of their service, and they are
obligated to notify the relevant authorities and consumers in the case of a
data breach. 208 Fourthly, subject to several exemptions, 209 service providers
are obligated to erase or anonymise the data processed when no longer
needed. 210
4.3 Singapore
Singapore’s key data protection law is the Personal Data Protection Act
(PDPA) 211 which is structured around the fundamental principles of FIPs.
202. PSD2, Articles 66 & 67.
203. PSD2, supra note 175 at Article 96(1).
204. PSD2, supra note 175 at Article 96(1).
205. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications
sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), 2002 O.J. (L 201/37) [hereinafter E-Privacy
Directive].
206. Id. at Article 13.
207. Id.
at
Article
5(3)
&
Recital
24;
European
Commission,
Cookie
Policy,https://ec.europa.eu/info/cookies_en (explaining that Cookie is a small text file that a website
stores on the user’s computers or other devices when the user visits the site which allows the service
providers to recognise that user’s device and store some information about the user’s preferences or past
actions).
208. E-Privacy Directive, supra note 183 at Article 4.
209. E-Privacy Directive, supra note 183 at Article 15.
210. E-Privacy Directive, supra note at Article 6.
211. Personal Data Protection Act, 2012 (Sing.).
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These principles are very similar to those in the 2018 SAMR Specification
(2020 Revision) and the GDPR, and thus will not be discussed again here.
The PDPA is enforced by the Personal Data Protection Commission who has
the power to make orders to an organization to ensure its compliance with
the PDPA and impose penalties not exceeding S$1 million. 212 Criminal
penalties may also be imposed on organisations or individuals that obstruct
the commission or its authorised delegate in the performance of its duties or
powers under the PDPA. 213
The PDPA provides several rights to individuals. They can give notice
to the relevant organisations to withdraw their consent given or deemed to
have been given in respect of collection, use, or disclosure of their personal
data. 214 Individuals have rights to access personal data 215 and to make
corrections. 216 Besides, the PDPA provides for the right of an individual to
take civil action against an organisation if that individual suffers loss or
damage as a result of a contravention of the PDPA. 217 The possible remedies
include injunction, declaration, damages, or other relief as the court thinks
fit. The PDPA imposes very limited obligations on data processors. These
obligations are restricted to the areas of data security 218 and data retention. 219
The PDPA also establishes the Do Not Call Registry (DNCR) scheme,
which allows individuals to opt out of receiving certain direct marketing
messages. Section 40 of the PDPA states that “a subscriber may apply to the
Commission, in the form and manner prescribed to add his Singapore
telephone number to a register.” 220 The PDPA prohibits any person or
organisation from sending marketing messages to a number that is listed on
the DNCR. 221 Fines of up to S$10,000 may be imposed on the failure to
comply with the DNCR obligations. 222
There are a very wide range of circumstances allowing for the
collection, use, or disclosure of personal information without obtaining
consent from data subjects (or allowing collection from third parties).223
Many exemptions are phrased in very broad terms, which could give rise to
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Personal Data Protection Act § 48J.
Personal Data Protection Act Part X.
Personal Data Protection Act § 16.
Personal Data Protection Act §21.
Personal Data Protection Act § 22.
Personal Data Protection Act § 48O.
Personal Data Protection Act § 24
Personal Data Protection Act § 25.
Personal Data Protection Act § 40.
Personal Data Protection Act § 43.
Personal Data Protection Act § 51.
Personal Data Protection Act, § 17, Second to Fourth Schedules.
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significant legal uncertainty and undermine the effectiveness of such
protection.
Unlike the EU or China, Singapore does not distinguish between
general personal information and sensitive personal information. Therefore,
there is no enhanced protection on sensitive personal information. Currently,
under the PDPA, there is no mandatory requirement for data users to notify
authorities or data subjects about data breaches.
4.4 Hong Kong
The Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (PDPO) establishes Hong
Kong’s data protection legal framework. 224 All organisations that collect,
hold, process or use personal data must comply with the PDPO. Similar to
the EU’s approach, Hong Kong basically structures the PDPO around the
FIPs.
Hong Kong has strengthened its regulation on direct marketing by
adding relevant provisions as such into the PDPO effective from 1 April
2013. Data users must obtain subjects’ express consent before they use or
transfer the data subjects’ personal data for marketing purposes. 225 Noncompliance with the direct marketing provisions is an offence, and the
highest penalties are a fine of HK$500,000 and imprisonment for three
years. 226 Under the PDPO, there is no mandatory requirement of data breach
notification or the appointment of data protection officers. The PDPO also
fails to regulate data processors appointed by data users for the data process.
The sanctions under the PDPO are very limited. A contravention of the
data protection principles does not in itself constitute a crime or result in any
punishment. The Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data has the power to
issue notices requiring data users to take steps to make corrections or prevent
further violations. 227 Data users will only commit an offence if they fail to
comply with the enforcement notice or violate the requirement again. In that
case, the maximum fine is HK$50,000 and imprisonment for two years. 228 If
a data user contravenes more than one notice, the maximum penalty is a fine
of HK $500,000 and imprisonment for three years. 229

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Hong Kong) (Cap. 486).
PDPO, § 35E.
PDPO, § 35E(4).
PDPO, § 50.
PDPO, § 50A.
PDPO, § 50B.
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5. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Comparative Insights and Merits of the Chinese Law
The above examination of some major jurisdictions’ data protection
regimes shows that both the US and the EU have well-established regulatory
frameworks, but the EU’s model is proven to be more influential in shaping
other jurisdictions’ data protection laws, such as those of Singapore and
Hong Kong. We also note that the effectiveness of Singapore’s data
protection law is partially undermined by its wide exemptions, while the
sanctions under Hong Kong’s data protection law are inadequate.
In the EU, the right to data protection is a fundamental right 230 and
protected by a comprehensive set of legal rules. The GDPR has a wide scope
of application, covering all natural or legal persons collecting and processing
personal data. By comparison, in the US, there is no unified data protection
law and the respective data protection provisions are scattered among many
laws that regulate different sectors. While the EU’s data protection law is
structured around data subjects’ right to data protection, the US’s philosophy
of data protection is based on the idea that consumers’ interests should be
protected against deception or unfairness. 231 Despite their different
approaches, data protection laws on both sides are informed by the FIPs and
share the core principles of fairness, lawfulness, transparency, data
minimisation, purpose limitation and so forth. But some principles in the US
are less stringent than those in the EU. One classic example is that data
subjects in the US are generally required to opt out to stop sharing their
personal data with third parties rather than opt into the service. The
underlying reason behind the less stringent requirements seems that the US
is trying to strike a balance between Internet economy innovation and
consumer protection. 232
By comparing China’s regulatory approach with other jurisdictions, we
find that China started with a piecemeal approach resembling the US model
but is now moving towards the EU’s principle-based approach. 233 The 2018
SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), as a comprehensive guide of data
protection, substantially follows the GDPR’s regulatory approach.
Significantly, the Cybersecurity Law and the 2018 SAMR Specification
230.
231.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 8.
Paul M. Schwartz and Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law (2017) 106
GEORGETOWN L. J. 115, 119 (2017).
232. Gina Stevens, Privacy Protections for Personal Information Online” 2 Cong. Res. Serv. 2
(2011).
233. For a comprehensive discussion, see Emmanuel Pernot-Leplay, China’s Approach on Data
Privacy Law: A Third Way Between the U.S. and the E.U.? 8 PENN ST. J. L. & INT’L AFFS. 49 (2020).
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(2020 Revision) widen the application scope, covering all organizations that
collect and process personal data, and impose strict obligations of data
protection on them.
For mobile payment, the laws and regulations address the privacy risks
of mobile payment, such as target advertising. For instance, “the information
that may reflect a specific person (without necessarily identifying) them”234
now falls within personal information so that the collection and processing
of personal data will be subject to the data protection requirements under the
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision). It would help to deal with target
marketing, one of the major threats to the data privacy of mobile payments,
particularly in the case where target marketing does not directly use
personally identifiable information but often uses software to build personal
profiles excluding the necessary identifiable information. 235
The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) deals with online
tracking problems that are often considered intrusive and threatening to
personal data privacy. Many online platform service providers would place
cookies or similar tracking devices on users’ equipment without their
knowledge to track their online behaviour and usage patterns in order to
develop a specific profile and provide consumers with tailored
advertisements. 236 The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) regards
the information of online activities as sensitive information and requires
service providers to obtain the users’ opt-in consent before collecting such
information. 237
The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) also makes a
distinction between anonymized data and de-identified data. 238 It does not
exclude the de-identified data from the scope of personal information as this
type of data may still be identified with the help of additional information. 239
The special mechanisms of protecting sensitive personal information are
introduced, such as explicit consent from data subjects before collection, 240
encryption storage and transmission of sensitive information, 241 as well as
234. Greenleaf Graham and Livingston Scott, China’s Personal Information Standard: The Long
March to a Privacy Law 150 PRIV. L. & BUS. INT’L REP. 25, 26 (2017).
235. Paul M.Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of
Personally Identifiable Information 86 N.Y.Univ. L. REV. 1814, 1854–55 (2011).
236. Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee, and Paul M. Schwartz, Data Mining and Internet Profiling:
Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches 75 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 261, 271 (2008).
237. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), §5.4(b).
238. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), supra note 58 at §§3.14 - 3.15.
239. Paul Ohm, Broken Promise of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization,
57 UCLA L. REV., 1701, 1716-27 (2010).
240. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), supra note 58 at § 5.5.
241. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), supra note 58 at §6.2.
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special controls of accessing sensitive information. 242 Likewise, under the
2020 PBOC Specification, financial institutions should use de-identification,
anonymisation or encryption where necessary to protect the personal
financial information after collection. 243
In relation to the consent requirement, the 2018 SAMR Specification
(2020 Revision) prohibits the bundle or forced consent. 244 Opt-in consent is
required before the collection of sensitive information is allowed. 245 The
principle of transparency is also strengthened. The disclosure statements are
required to be presented in a concise, meaningful, timely and accessible
manner. 246 A standardised short-form notice is introduced to allow users to
digest privacy policies more easily. 247
As discussed before, the PBOC has played a proactive role in
strengthening data privacy protection for the financial industry. The 2020
PBOC Specification represents the PBOC’s more recent effort in this regard.
It adds some industry-specific parameters by grading the personal financial
information into three categories, which in turn require different protective
measures. By doing so, it provides clearer guidance on data protection for
the relevant institutions, including banks and non-bank payment institutions.
In general, the 2020 PBOC Specification largely aligns with the 2018 SAMR
Specification (2020 Revision) on the FIPs and specific technical
requirements, such as de-identification, anonymisation and encryption.
Overall, in relation to data privacy protection, the rules issued by the
PBOC 248 are essentially intended to embody and specify the general
regulatory requirements of data protection for the financial markets, and do
not really introduce many new regulations. While the general regulatory
regime can be used to deal with many privacy risks in mobile payment, some
risks are much more acute for mobile payment users. Accordingly, it is
important for the regulators to make specific rules to facilitate compliance
and enforcement regarding the privacy issue in mobile payment.

242. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), supra note 58 at §7.1(e).
243. 2020 PBOC Specification, supra note 65 at § 6.1.
244. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), supra note 58 at §5.3(a).
245. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), supra note 58 at §5.5.
246. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), supra note 58 at §§5.5(b) - (c).
247. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), supra note 58 at Appendix D.
248. For example, “Feiyinhang Zhifu Jigou Wangluo zhifu yewu guanli banfa” (非银行支付机构
网络支付业务管理办法) [The Management Measures of the Mobile Payment Business of the Non-bank
Payment Institutions] (issued by the People’s Bank of China on 28 December 2015, effective from 28
December 2015); Zhongguo renmin yinhang jinrong xiaofeizhe quanyi baohu shishi banfa” (中国人民
银行金融消费者权益保护实施办法) [Measures for the Protection of the Rights and Interests of
Financial Consumers of the People’s Bank of China] (issued by the People’s Bank of China on 15
September 2020, effective from 1 November 2020).
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5.2 Remaining Problems and Recommendations
5.2.1 Improving Certain Regulatory Requirements and Principles
For mobile payment, there are some remaining problems with the
regulation, the chief among which is the ineffective requirements of consent
and disclosure, the ambiguous principle of purpose limitation, and the
limited applicability of the principle of data minimisation. These problems
need to be addressed in order to improve the efficacy of the regulation.
To begin with, while the disclosure requirement is crucial to data
protection, the effectiveness of disclosure is undermined in the context of
mobile payment. One major reason is that the privacy policies are often
provided in scrolling text boxes present on mobile phones’ small screens. 249
They are often several pages long, and users usually would not spend
considerable time reading the policies which are full of complex and
technical terms before using a particular service. The inefficiency of the
disclosure requirement further undermines the effectiveness of the consent
requirement. 250 Although the 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision)
requires consumers’ affirmative consent, many consumers may simply tick
consent boxes without reading or understanding the policies. 251 The
prohibition on bundle consent is mainly theoretical with little practical
meaning, as a single collection request for its major mobile payment service
will allow the mobile payment service providers to collect all the necessary
information. If consumers refuse to accept the privacy policy, their access to
the platform will be denied.
Inspired by the EU’s approach, this article makes two recommendations
to solve this issue. First, a multi-layered notice mechanism can be used.
Specifically speaking, the essential information in relation to the data
collection and processing should be presented in the initial notice to the
consumers in a concise and readable manner. 252 It can be combined with the
use of icons, images or videos. Further detailed information can be made
available through hyperlinks. 253 The primary purpose of this approach is to
249. Marla Blow, Statement for the Record of Marla Blow before the House Financial Services
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, House Financial Services Subcommittee,
2, (2012), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ba15-wstate-cfpb-20120629.pdf
250. Bert-Jaap Koops, The Trouble with European Data Protection Law 4(4) International Data
Protection Law 250, 251 (2014).
251. Marla Blow, supra note 227.
252. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices, 24, a
https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp202_en.pdf
253. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices”24,
(Feb. 27, 2013) https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/
2013/wp202_en.pdf (hereinafter Data Protection Working Party).
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allow consumers to quickly grasp the key information on the privacy
policies. Second, we note that the mobile payment service providers usually
make their service contingent upon consumers’ acceptance of their privacy
policy practices of extensively collecting their personal information (both
financial and ancillary information). The problem with this “take-it-or-leaveit” approach is, however, particularly unfair to the consumers in China where
the mobile payment market is dominated by two giants – Alipay and WeChat
Pay, and consumers do not have much choice but to accept their privacy
policies. Therefore, like the requirement of the PSD2 in the EU, the data
controllers should only collect and process personal data necessary for the
provision of their payment services. Even if they intend to collect ancillary
data for additional purposes (such as marketing purpose), a separate consent
from consumers must be obtained.
Further, the Cybersecurity Law does not contain the principle of
purpose limitation. The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) also fails
to give a detailed definition of this principle except a simple statement that
“the use of personal information should not exceed the scope that is directly
or reasonably related to the purpose claimed at the time of the collection of
personal information.” 254 The issue is how to determine whether the purpose
for which the data is originally collected and processed is directly or
reasonably related to the purpose of further processing. For example, one
privacy concern arising in mobile payment is target advertising. If we booked
a flight on an online platform, we may find that this platform will keep
recommending advertisements on hotels after the booking. Would we say
that this advertising is directly or reasonably relevant to the original purpose
of collecting information, which is supposed to be the execution of payment?
The EU’s Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has provided a
systematic approach to deal with this issue. When examining whether the
additional purpose of processing data is directly or reasonably related to the
original purpose, the following factors could be taken into consideration:
whether the new purpose was already implied or a logical next step in the
processing, whether the consumers expressly consented to the further
processing, whether the processing involved sensitive personal information,
and whether the controllers have adopted safeguards “to ensure fair
processing and to prevent any undue impact on the data subjects (e.g.,
anonymisation, increased transparency, a possibility to object).” 255 Another
practical approach to deal with this problem is that a data controller could

254.
255.

2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 7.3.
Data Protection Working Party at 3.
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list the original purpose and the additional purposes of collecting and
processing data, allowing consumers to opt-in for the acceptable ones.
Last but not least, under the 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision),
the principle of data minimisation only applies to the stage of data
collection. 256 By comparison, under the GDPR, the principle of data
minimization does not only apply to data collection but applies to all types
of data processing. 257 It is possible for information that is initially collected
in a lawful manner under this principle to be illegally processed later.
Therefore, it is important to ensure that all stages of data processing should
comply with the principle of data minimisation.
5.2.2 Establishing A Unified Data Protection Law and A Unified
Enforcement Agency
Although China is moving toward a coherent legal structure on data
protection, the relevant laws and regulations are still broad-brush and
repetitive. The 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision) and the 2020
PBOC Specification are not mandatory, but rather serve as voluntary
industry standards. No direct penalties would be applied for contravention of
these two specifications. Although they can act as reference for law
enforcement authorities to decide compliance with various data protection
rules, the authorities have latitude in their enforcement and this can create
significant legal uncertainty. We can find that a unified data protection law
is a global common practice. It is submitted that China should incorporate
the basic principles and specific requirements of data protection into one
unified law to reduce fragmentation of laws, strengthen consistency in
enforcement, simplify the regulatory environment, and reduce unnecessary
costs and administrative burden. In light of our analysis on the efficiency of
China’s current data privacy protection regime, it is recommended that future
legislation could be structured around two well-recognised axes. 258 The first
one is privacy by design, where companies are obligated to comply with the
data protection requirements at every stage of the development of products
and services. The second axis is privacy by default where the data controllers
make pre-existing choices on behalf of the data subjects regarding the data
processing option, and in doing so, they must ensure that only the personal
data that is necessary to achieve the purpose of the processing is enabled.
256. 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), Section 5.2.
257. GDPR, Article 5.
258. GDPR, Article 25;but see Ira S. Rubinstein and Nathaniel Good, “The Trouble with Article 25
(and How to Fix It): the Future of Data Protection by Design and Default” (2020) 10(1) International
Data Privacy Law, 37.

264

CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.

Vol 20:2

Apart from a unified data protection law, there is also a need for a
unified enforcement agency, which is more efficiently structured to facilitate
the enforcement of the law. Under China’s current regulatory regime, there
are multiple enforcement agencies responsible for enforcing the myriad
statutory protections, including but not limited to the Cyberspace
Administration of China, the Public Security Bureau, and the MIIT. In
addition, as non-bank financial institutions, mobile payment service
providers are also subject to the regulation of both the PBOC and the CBIRC.
The SAMR has the general responsibility to protect consumers’ rights,
including the right to data protection.
By examining the experiences of those overseas jurisdictions, we note
that a unified law enforcement agency is a common practice in data privacy
protection. However, in China, the enforcement could be hampered by the
existence of multiple enforcement agencies authorized by different laws.
This is illustrated by the Alipay case. At the end of 2017, Ant Financial (an
affiliate of Alibaba Group Holding Limited operating the Alipay mobile
payment services of Alibaba’s shopping platform) launched its Alipay
Annual User Footprint Report within its Alipay mobile wallet application,
allowing users to look how they had spent their money over the year. 259
However, the landing page of the report had a small box that was checked
by default, which provided that “I consent to the ‘Sesame Credit Service
Agreement’”. Users who did not notice the checked box would have agreed
by default to opt into this agreement under which Ant Financial can direct
users’ information to the third party Sesame Credit, and the users were not
allowed to revoke their consent. 260 When Alipay’s grasping terms of service
came into light, many users expressed their grave concerns over their data
privacy. 261
As Ant Financial is subject to the regulation of multiple authorities,
including the Cyberspace Administration of China, the MIIT and the PBOC,
these authorities have taken different actions against the company. On 6
January 2018, the Security and Coordination Office of the Cyberspace
Administration of China made inquiries into Ant Financial and Sesame
Credit, concluding that Ant Financial failed to meet the data protection

259. SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Alibaba’s payments affiliate apologises for opting in users
for credit scoring system, (Jan. 4, 2018, 11:09 am), https://www.scmp.com/tech/chinatech/article/2126772/chinas-ant-financial-apologises-over-alipay-user-data-gaffe.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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requirements set out in the 2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision). 262
On 11 January 2018, the Communication Management Office of the MIIT
inquired into three technology companies – Alibaba Group, Baidu and
ByteDance and reprimanded these companies for not giving sufficient
notification to users on their privacy policies. 263 These companies were
requested to immediately rectify and improve their privacy policy to protect
the users’ rights and interests. 264 On 22 March 2018, the Hangzhou Central
Branch of the PBOC imposed an administrative fine of 180,000 yuan on Ant
Financial on the basis that the data practice of Ant Financial failed to provide
adequate protection for financial consumers’ right to know and right to
choose. 265
In summary, the lack of a single privacy law enforcement agency has
caused conflict and friction between different authorities, leading to
fragmented and incoherent decision-making. Different authorities may also
bring actions for the same violation, which will not only result in a waste of
regulatory and judicial resources but will also give rise to the issue of
inconsistent judgments. Therefore, China should consider establishing a
unified agency responsible for the enforcement of a unified data protection
law.
5.2.3 Enhancing both Public and Private Enforcement
As with any other areas of law, the effectiveness of the data protection
regime depends on both substantive rules and enforcement strategies. In
general, law enforcement strategies can be broadly divided into two modes
– public enforcement and private enforcement. Public enforcement is
initiated by a state official such as a regulator or a prosecutor, while private
enforcement is done so by a private party in the form of civil actions for
compensation or rescission. These two modes of law enforcement have their
own strengths and weaknesses. For instance, public enforcement has
advantages vis-à-vis private enforcement in terms of the power to investigate
and impose severe penalties. Private enforcement, however, has its own
strengths. First, while the function of deterring misconduct is common to
both public and private enforcement, private enforcement also has the
262. XINHUA NET, “Ant Financial Services Group reflects on ‘Alipay Annual Billing Incident’:
Platform
Governance
Will
be
Improved”
(Jan.
10,
2018,
13:12
pm),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2018-01/10/c_1122238416.htm.
263. SINA, “MIIT reprimanded Alipay, ByteDance and Baidu to rectify” (Jan. 13, 2018, 01:37 am),
http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2018-01-13/doc-ifyqqciz6242328.shtml.
264. Id.
265. PEOPLE’S NET, “Alipay was fined 180,000 yuan for multiple violations” (Apr. 09, 2018),
http://it.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0409/c1009-29913402.html.
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important function of compensating victims which public enforcement
usually cannot perform. Second, the efficacy of public enforcement depends
very much on the organizational capacity and resources of the regulator. As
discussed above, there is a need for China to establish a uniform regulator
for data protection. Hence, China is advised to pursue both enforcement
strategies in relation to the data protection law.
On the one hand, private enforcement in the form of civil litigation is
often sought on the basis of tort law, but a claimant may face many
difficulties in pursuing the action. First, there can be an enormous imbalance
of economic power and information asymmetry between the aggrieved
individuals and the organizational data controllers, which makes it difficult
for the claimants to produce evidence and prove the tortious act. This
problem may become particularly acute where the data controllers
exclusively possess the impugned information. For instance, in the case of
Lin Nianping v. Sichuan Airlines Co., Ltd, 266 a passenger named Lin
Nianping sued Sichuan Airlines for disclosing his personal information
(including his name, phone number, and flight information) to a third party
who subsequently misled Lin Nianping to buy another air ticket. The court
found that Lin Nianping was an ordinary consumer who did not possess
material evidence to prove the respondent’s actual negligence of failing to
protect personal data, whereas Sichuan Airlines Co Ltd was in a favourable
position to provide the necessary evidence to prove otherwise. Lin Nianping
had already proven a strong likelihood that the company disclosed its
passenger’s information, and it would be unfair to require him to further
prove that Sichuan Airline Co Ltd was actually negligent. The reversal of the
evidential burden has also been confirmed in Pang Lipeng v. China Eastern
Airlines Co., Ltd. and Beijing Qunar Information Technology Co., Ltd 267
which was later compiled by the Supreme People’s Court into the list “The
First Batch of Typical Cases Related to the Internet.” 268 The Supreme Court
remarked that the claimant as an ordinary passenger did not have the ability
to prove the respondents’ negligence of failing to protect personal data, and
266. Lin Nianping yu Sichuan hangkong gufen youxian gongsi qinquan zeren jiufenan (林念平与
四川航空股份有限公司侵权责任纠纷案)[Lin Nianping v. Sichuan Airlines Co., Ltd (regarding the
dispute on tort liabilities)] (Chengdu Intermediate People’s Court of Sichuan Province, civil (1634) 2015).
267. Pang Lipeng su zhongguo dongfang hangkong gufen youxian gongsi, Beijing quna xinxi jishu
youxian gongsi yinsiquan jiufenan (庞理鹏诉中国东方航空股份有限公司、北京趣拿信息技术有限
公司隐私权纠纷案) [Pang Lipeng v. China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd. and Beijing Qunar Information
Technology Co., Ltd (regarding the dispute on right of privacy)] (The First Intermediate People’s Court
of Beijing, civil (509) 2017).
268. “Diyipi she hulianwang dianxing anli” (第一批涉互联网典型案例) [The First Batch of
Typical Cases Related to the Internet] (issued by the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC on 16 August
2018).
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the court cannot and should not require the claimant to prove that the
respondent must have leaked the passenger’s personal information. It was
for the respondent to prove otherwise.
The second difficulty lies in the problem of proving concrete harm or
loss suffered by the aggrieved party as “the risk accompanying the collection,
use, and dissemination of personal data is accumulative.” 269 Thirdly, even
though the claimants could succeed in their claims, the courts may only
award a small amount of damages. For example, in Lin Nianping, the court
eventually ordered Sichuan Airline Co Ltd to make an apology and
compensate Lin Nanping with 5,648 yuan (about US$806). 270 In Pang
Lipeng, the court only ordered an apology to be made. 271 It may discourage
the aggrieved party from bringing private actions. Fourthly, many data
practices, such as data harvesting and profiling, often take place in a nontransparent manner. Without the knowledge of how their data are misused,
individuals cannot effectively protect their personal data on their own.
On the other hand, under the mode of public enforcement, the relevant
competent departments may order the organisations to make corrections, and
can, according to the circumstances, confiscate any illegal income, and
impose a fine of not less than one time and not more than ten times the illegal
gains. If there are no illegal gains, a fine of not more than 1,000,000 yuan
shall be imposed, and the person in charge and other persons directly
responsible shall be fined not less than 10,000 yuan but not more than
100,000 yuan. 272 However, there are two issues with administrative fines.
First, it may be easy to calculate the gains from the illegal trade in data but
it would prove difficult to assess the unlawful gains made by internet
companies. As discussed above, many internet companies, like Google and
Facebook, do not trade in the personal data but use the data for target
advertising and supply the data to develop their artificial-intelligence
services, which can in turn generate new sources of profits. Assuming the
data used in the development of artificial-intelligence services is illegally
collected or processed, should we take into account the remote gains derived
from the development of new technology? Secondly, the current level of
fines in China is inadequate to act as a deterrent. In the Alipay Case, Alipay
was only fined 180,000 yuan (about US$25,700) by the PBOC, which was
negligible compared with this technology giant’s annual revenue. By
269. Ding Xiaodong, “Personal Data Protection: Rethinking the Reasons, Nature, and Legal
Framework” (2018) 13 Frontiers of Law in China 380, 387.
270. Supra n.237.
271. Supra n.238.
272. Cybersecurity Law, Article 64.
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comparison, the GDPR allows European data protection authorities to fine
companies up to the higher of €20 million or 4 percent of their global
turnover for the most serious category of data protection violations. 273
With the above observations, this article makes the following
suggestions. First, given the massive asymmetry of information and
evidential difficulties which limit the utility of private enforcement, this
article suggests that a “piggyback” mechanism be introduced whereby the
private action follows and thus can piggyback on the public enforcement in
relation to threshold questions, such as the occurrence of infringements and
the guilt of relevant people. 274 Second, as most data privacy infringements
are motivated by the pursuit of profits, substantial fines can be introduced to
deter illegal use of personal data. 275 To incentivise data controllers and data
processors to comply with the requirements of data protection, future
legislation should develop a system of determining fines for wrongdoers by
taking into consideration economic and informational power of data
controllers and processors, past acts of non-compliance, and the risks to
which personal data is exposed as a result of their illegal practices. Similarly,
in the private enforcement, the compensation awarded to the victims could
be calculated by reference to the extent to which the personal data is illegally
collected and the risk to which the personal data is exposed in the illegal data
practices.
6. CONCLUSION
Mobile payment has transformed the Chinese economy. While
consumers are enjoying the great benefits provided by mobile payment, they
are also plagued by the serious issue of data privacy risks. This article first
examined the development of mobile payment in China, and the factors
responsible for the heightened privacy risks of mobile payment. It found that
the involvement of multiple players in mobile payment and extensive data
harvesting contribute to these privacy risks. This article then discussed the
transformation process of China’s data protection regime, under which
China started with a piecemeal approach and is now moving towards a
principle-based framework. At present, China’s data protection regime is
mainly comprised of the Cybersecurity Law and relevant regulatory rules
273. GDPR, Article 83(5)-(6).
274. A piggyback mechanism of this kind has been employed for the bringing of private securities
litigation in China. For a detailed discussed of this mechanism, see Robin Hui Huang, “Private
Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A Ten-year Retrospective and Empirical Assessment” (2013)
61 American Journal of Comparative Law 757.
275. Paul Nemitz, “Fines under the GDPR” (2017), CPDP 2017 Conference
Book,https://ssrn.com/abstract=3270535
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such as the 2020 PBOC Specification, which together set out the key
regulatory elements such as the concept of personal information, the
obligations for data controllers and processors, as well as the principles of
the FIPs.
By examining the experiences of some overseas jurisdictions, including
the US, the EU, Singapore and Hong Kong, this article found that China’s
current regulatory approach bears more resemblance to that of the EU. The
2018 SAMR Specification (2020 Revision), as a comprehensive guide to
personal data security and privacy, substantially follows the GDPR’s
regulatory structure. China’s current regulatory regime strengthens the
standard of privacy protection and addresses a series of privacy issues arising
in mobile payment, such as target advertising and online tracking. Despite
China’s efforts to enhance data privacy protection in the digital age, more
needs to be done. This article made the following observations and
suggestions. Firstly, there are some remaining issues, including, among
others, the ineffective requirements of consent and disclosure, the ambiguous
principle of purpose limitation, and the limited applicability of the principle
of data minimisation. Secondly, a unified law and a unified enforcement
agency should be established to reduce the fragmentation of laws, strengthen
consistency in enforcement, simplify the regulatory environment, and reduce
unnecessary costs and administrative burden. Finally, both private
enforcement and public enforcement should be strengthened to compel data
controllers to comply with the regulatory requirements.

